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Pennsylvania Standard For Involuntary Civil
Commitment Of The Mentally Ill: A Clear And
Present Danger?
INTRODUCTION
The standard currently used in Pennsylvania to determine
whether a mentally ill' individual should be involuntarily commit-
ted 2 to treatment was enacted in 1976.3 This standard,4 along with
procedures to initiate and continue commitment,5 was enacted to
replace a law that had been passed only ten years before,' but
which had been found constitutionally deficient.7 This comment
1. The Mental Health Procedures Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 7101-7503 (Purdon
Supp. 1988), does not contain a definition of mental illness. However, the Act does exclude
mental retardation, senility, alcoholism, and drug addiction from the term mental illness,
unless these conditions are accompanied by another condition considered a mental illness.
Id. at § 7102.
The statute specifically repealed the definition of mental disability contained in the
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 4101 et. seq.
(Purdon 1969), except as the definition related to mental retardation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50
§ 7502(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988). The repealed section defined mental disability as:
[Any mental illness, mental impairment, mental retardation, or mental deficiency,
which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judgment
and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary
or advisable for him to be under care as provided in this act. It shall include condi-
tions and terms heretofore defined as 'insanity,' 'unsoundness of mind,' 'lunacy,'
'mental disease,' 'mental disorder,' 'feeble-minded,' 'moron,' 'idiot' and 'imbecile.'
This term shall not include senility, unless mental illness or mental retardation is
superimposed.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 4102 (Purdon 1969).
2. This comment concerns only involuntary commitment and does not address the is-
sue of voluntary commitment which is governed under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 7201-7206
(Purdon Supp. 1988).
3. The Mental Health Procedures Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 7101-7503 (Purdon
Supp. 1988). For additional background on the passage of the Act, see Comment, Pennsyl-
vania's Mental Health Procedures Act, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 669 (1977).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 7301 (Purdon Supp. 1988). For a complete discussion of this
section see infra notes 15 through 25 and accompanying text.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 7302-7305 (Purdon Supp. 1988). For a complete discussion
of these sections, see infra notes 26 through 71 and accompanying text.
6. The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§
4401-4408 (Purdon 1969).
7. Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976). In Goldy, the plaintiff, an involun-
tarily committed resident of a state hospital, brought a class action alleging that the Penn-
sylvania standards for involuntary commitment violated the civil rights of such persons. Id.
at 642. The court ruled that the Pennsylvania standard was unconstitutionally vague and
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will focus on the current standard for involuntary civil commit-
ment,8 how the Pennsylvania courts have applied this standard,'
the problems posed by such a standard,10 and whether the stan-
dard should be changed."'
THE STATUTORY STANDARD FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
The Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act was passed by
the legislature on July 9, 1976, and went into effect sixty days
later. 2 This Act sets forth a standard for determining which men-
tally ill persons are subject to involuntary civil commitment,13 and
also sets forth procedures for the involuntary civil commitment of
these persons.1 4 The statute defines those persons subject to civil
commitment as individuals who are severely mentally disabled and
in need of immediate treatment. 15 A severe mental disability is
present, according to the statute, when mental illness diminishes
the individual's self-control, judgment and discretion in the areas
of caring for her affairs, conducting social relationships or satisfy-
ing personal needs to such an extent that she poses a "clear and
present danger of harm to others or himself."16
The legislature did not leave the term "clear and present dan-
ger" open to broad judicial interpretation; instead, it established
enjoined its use. Id. at 649. However, because this action would have left Pennsylvania with-
out an involuntary commitment statute, the court entered a stay of the order until Septem-
ber 7, 1976, the date the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § §
7101-7503 (Purdon Supp. 1988) became effective. 429 F. Supp. at 649-50.
For a history of mental health law up to the 1966 statute, see Comment, Hospitalization
of the Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: The Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act of
1966, 71 DICK. L. REV. 300 (1967).
8. The scope of this comment includes only civil commitments and does not address
the issue of mentally ill persons charged and/or convicted of crimes.
9. This comment will provide only a representative sample of cases. See infra notes
71 to 160 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 161 through 175 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 176 to 193 and accompanying text.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 7301-7503 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
13. Id. at § 7301.
14. Id. at §§ 7302-7305.
15. Id. at § 7301(a). The statute states, in pertinent part: "Whenever a person is se-
verely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he may be made subject to
involuntary emergency examination and treatment." Id.
16. Id. The statute reads, in part:
A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity
to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and so-
cial relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear
and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
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criteria that must be met to determine that the individual poses a
clear and present danger to herself or others.17 A clear and present
danger to others is shown if it is proven that the individual has,
within the past thirty days, attempted to inflict, or has inflicted,
serious bodily harm on another person, and that there exists a rea-
sonable probability that she will do so again.18 Although it must be
shown that harm was inflicted or attempted, threats or acts are not
explicitly required to make such a showing; however, they may be
used as proof.19
To determine if an individual poses a clear and present danger
to herself, the statute looks for objective evidence of harmful be-
havior which the individual has directed toward herself.20 Thus, it
must be established that the individual: 1) is unable to provide for
basic personal needs, such as food, shelter, medical care, or to pro-
vide for her personal safety, and that it is reasonably probable
that, within thirty days, this inability will result in death, serious
bodily injury, or physical debilitation; 2' 2) the individual has at-
17. Id. at § 7301(b).
18. Id. at § 7301(b)(1). The section reads: "Clear and present danger to others shall be
shown by establishing that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to
inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there is a reasonable probability that such
conduct will be repeated." Id.
19. Id. In pertinent part, the statute states: "For the purpose of this section, a clear
and present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has
made threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm."
Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id. at § 7301(b)(2). This section reads as follows:
(2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by establishing that within the
past 30 days:
(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable,
without care, supervision and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need
for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and
that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious
physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were af-
forded under this act; or
(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is the reasonable probability of
suicide unless adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of this
subsection, a clear and present danger may be demonstrated by the proof that the
person has made threats to commit suicide and has committed acts which are in fur-
therance of the threat to commit suicide; or
(iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself
substantially and that there is the reasonable probability of mutilation unless ade-
quate treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of this subsection, a
clear and present danger shall be established by proof that the person has made
threats to commit mutilation and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the
threat to commit mutilation.
Id.
21. Id. at § 7301(b)(2)(i).
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tempted suicide and it is reasonably probable that she will commit
suicide unless treated;22 or 3) the individual has substantially mu-
tilated herself, or has attempted substantial self-mutilation, and it
is reasonably probable that mutilation will occur without
treatment.23
PROCEDURE FOR COMMITMENT
The statute employs the aforementioned standard in its proce-
dures for civil commitment. 24 These piocedures are set forth in a
series of steps that must be taken to commit an individual for a
specified period of time. 25 Although this comment is primarily con-
cerned with the standard for involuntary commitment, rather than
the procedures for such commitment, an understanding of the pro-
cedures will be helpful in assessing the problems involved in apply-
ing the standard and in determining the possible need for a change
in the standard.
First, the statute provides for emergency examination and treat-
ment for a period not to exceed 120 hours (5 days).26 An emergency
examination may be authorized under the following conditions: 1)
physician certification that such an examination is necessary,27 or
2) personal observation of the individual by a physician, police of-
ficer or mental health authority that constitutes reasonable
grounds to believe the individual is ill and in need of treatment."
22. Id. at § 7301(b)(2)(ii). For purposes of this section, suicide threats or steps taken
to commit suicide are sufficient to establish an attempted suicide. Id.
23. Id. at § 7301(b)(2)(iii). For purposes of this section, threats of mutilation are suffi-
cient to establish the behavior necessary for commitment. Id.
24. Id. at §§ 7302-7305.
25. Id.
26. Id. at § 7203.
27. Id. at § 7302(a)(1). This section states, in pertinent part:
Upon written application by a physician or other responsible party setting forth facts
constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and
in need of immediate treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant re-
quiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to take such person to the
facility specified in the warrant.
Id.
28. Id. at § 7302(a)(2), which states in part:
Upon personal observation of the conduct of a person constituting reasonable
grounds to believe that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment, and physician or peace officer, or anyone authorized by the county admin-
istrator may take such person to an approved facility for an emergency examination.
Upon arrival, he shall make a written statement setting forth the grounds for believ-
ing the person to be in need of such examination.
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An individual taken to a mental health facility for an examina-
tion pursuant to these provisions must be examined within two
hours to determine whether she meets the clear and present dan-
ger standard.2 a If the individual is found to meet the standard,
treatment may begin immediately and can continue for up to 120
hours.30 The mentally ill individual has the right to be informed of
the reason for the examination and to communicate with others,
including the right to use the telephone.3 1
If the individual needs additional treatment and will not consent
to such treatment, an application for extended involuntary treat-
ment may be filed by the staff of the mental health facility with
the court of common pleas . 2 Within twenty-four hours of the filing
29. Id. at § 7302(b). This section states:
A person taken to a facility shall be examined by a physician within two hours of
arrival in order to determine if the person is severely mentally disabled within the
meaning of section 7301 and in need of immediate treatment. If it is determined that
the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency treatment, treat-
ment shall be begun immediately. If the physician does not so find, or if at any time
it appears there is no longer a need for immediate treatment, the person shall be
discharged and returned to such place as he may reasonably direct. The physician
shall make a record of the examination and his findings. In no event shall a person be
accepted for involuntary emergency treatment if a previous application was granted
for such treatment and the new application is not based on behavior occurring after
the earlier application.
Id.
30. Id. at § 7302(d). This part of the statute reads as follows:
A person who is in treatment pursuant to this section shall be discharged whenever it
is determined that he no longer is in need of treatment and in any event within 120
hours, unless within such period:
(1) he is admitted to voluntary treatment pursuant to section 7202 of this act; or
(2) a certification for extended involuntary emergency treatment is filed pursuant to
section 7303 of this act.
Id.
31. Id. at § 7302(c). Section 7302(c) provides:
Upon arrival at the facility, the person shall be informed of the reasons for emergency
examination and of his right to communicate immediately with others. He shall be
given reasonable use of the telephone. He shall be requested to furnish the names of
parties whom he may want notified of his custody and kept informed of his status.
The county administrator or the director of the facility shall:
(1) give notice to such parties of the whereabouts and status of the person, how and
when he may be contacted and visited, and how they may obtain information con-
cerning him while he is in inpatient treatment; and
(2) take reasonable steps to assure that while the person is detained, the health and
safety needs of any of his dependents are met, and that his personal property and the
premises he occupies are secure.
Id.
32. Id. at § 7303(a). This section states:
Application for extended involuntary emergency treatment may be made for any per-
son who is being treated pursuant to section 7302 whenever the facility determines
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of such an application, a judge or a mental health review officer3 3
must conduct an informal hearing.34 The individual has a right to
counsel at this hearing and counsel must be appointed by the
court, unless the individual desires and can afford private
representation. 3
At the informal hearing, the judge or mental health review of-
ficer must inform the individual of the nature of the proceedings. 36
The judge or review officer must then consider evidence concerning
whether the individual meets the clear and present danger stan-
dard, and in particular, must review the necessity for continued
involuntary treatment.3 7 The reasons for continued involuntary
treatment must be given, in lay terms, by a physician who has ex-
that the need for emergency treatment is likely to extend beyond 120 hours. The
application shall be filed forthwith in the court of common pleas, and shall state the
grounds on which extended emergency treatment is believed to be necessary. The
application shall state the name of any examining physician and the substance of his
opinion regarding the mental condition of the person.
Id.
33. Id. at § 7303(b). A mental health review officer is defined in the Act as an individ-
ual authorized by the court to conduct proceedings. Id. at § 7109(a). The qualifications of
mental health review officers are defined in the Act. Such an individual "shall be members
of the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, without restriction as to the county of
their residence and where possible should be familiar with the field of mental health. Law-
trained municipal court judges may be appointed mental health review officers." Id.
34. Id. at § 7303(b), which reads:
Upon receiving such application, the court of common pleas shall appoint an attorney
who shall represent the person unless it shall appear that the person can afford, and
desires to have, private representation. Within 24 hours after the application is filed,
an informal hearing shall be conducted by a judge or by a mental health review officer
and, if practicable, shall be held at the facility.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at § 7303(c). Section 7303(c) reads:
(C) INFORMAL CONFERENCE ON EXTENDED EMERGENCY TREATMENT APPLICATION. - (1)
At the commencement of the informal conference, the judge or the mental health
review officer shall inform the person of the nature of the proceedings. Information
relevant to whether the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment
shall be reviewed, including the reasons that continued involuntary treatment is con-
sidered necessary. Such explanation shall be made by a physician who examined the
person and shall be in terms understandable to a layman. The judge or mental health
review officer may review any relevant information even if it would be normally ex-
cluded under rules of evidence if he believes that such information is reliable. The
person or his representative shall have the right to ask questions of the physician and
of any other witnesses and to present any relevant information. At the conclusion of
the review, if the judge or the review officer finds that the person is severely mentally
disabled and in need of continued involuntary treatment, he shall so certify. Other-
wise, he shall direct that the facility director or his designee discharge the person.
37. Id.
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amined the individual."
In reviewing the evidence, including the physician's recommen-
dations, the judge or mental health review officer is not bound by
strict rules of evidence, and may review any evidence she finds reli-
able.30 The due process rights of the individual are protected by
allowing the individual or counsel to examine the doctor and any
other witnesses, and to present any other relevant evidence.4 0
If after reviewing all of the relevant evidence the judge or mental
health review officer finds that the individual meets the clear and
present danger standard, she must file a certification in writing
that includes, inter alia, findings regarding the necessity for con-
tinued treatment; an explanation of the appropriateness and ade-
quacy of the treatment; a description of the treatment; and an ex-
planation of the individual's right to petition for release and the
right to counsel.4 1 A copy of this certification must be served on
counsel and other designated persons. The duration of additional
treatment under this certification is a maximum of twenty days,
with the proviso that the individual will be discharged from treat-
ment if she is no longer severely mentally disabled and in need of




41. Id. at § 7303(d). This provision reads:
(d) CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATION. - A certificate for extended involuntary treatment
shall be made in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall include:
(1) findings by the judge or mental health review officer as to the reasons that ex-
tended involuntary emergency treatment is necessary;
(2) a description of the treatment to be provided together with an explanation of the
adequacy and appropriateness of such treatment, based upon the information re-
ceived at the hearing;
(3) any documents required by the provisions of section 7302;
(4) the application as filed pursuant to section 7303(a);
(5) a statement that the person is represented by counsel; and
(6) an explanation of the effect of the certification, the person's right to petition the
court for release under subsection (g), and the continuing right to be represented by
counsel.
Id.
42. Id. at § 7303(e), which reads: "The certification shall be filed with the director of
the facility and a copy served on the person, such other parties as the person requested to
be notified pursuant to section 7302(c), and on counsel." Id.
43. Id. at § 7303(f) and (h). Section 7303(0 provides: "Upon the filing and service of a
certification for extended involuntary emergency treatment, the person may be given treat-
ment in an approved facility for a period not to exceed 20 days." Id. Section 7303(h) states:
(h) DURATION OF EXTENDED INVOLUNTARY EMERGENCY TREATMENT. - Whenever a per-
son is no longer severely mentally disabled or in need of immediate treatment and, in
any event, within 20 days after the filing of the certification, he shall be discharged,
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tion is made by a mental health review officer, rather than a judge,
the individual has the right to have it reviewed by the court of
common pleas."
The Act also provides for involuntary treatment not to exceed
ninety days."' The procedure to be followed in cases involving such
commitments varies, depending upon whether the individual is
currently undergoing involuntary treatment." If the individual is
undergoing such treatment, a written petition setting forth reason-
able grounds to indicate that the individual is a clear and present
danger to herself or others" must be filed by the director of the
facility treating the individual, or the county mental health admin-
istrator, with the court of common pleas.4 8 The petition must con-
tain the name of the examining physician and that physician's
unless within such period:
(1) he is admitted to voluntary treatment pursuant to section 7202; or
(2) the court orders involuntary treatment pursuant to section 7304.
Id.
44. Id. at § 7303(g). This section provides:
In all cases in which the hearing was conducted by a mental health review officer, a
person made subject to treatment pursuant to this section shall have the right to
petition the court of common pleas for review of the certification. A hearing shall be
held within 72 hours after the petition is filed unless a continuance is requested by
the person's counsel. The hearing shall include a review of the certification and such
evidence as the court may receive or require. If the court determines that further
involuntary treatment is necessary and that the procedures prescribed by this act
have been followed, it shall deny the petition. Otherwise, the person shall be
discharged.
Id.
45. Id. at § 7304. Section 7304(a) states:
(a) PERSONS FOR WHOM APPLICATION MAY BE MADE. - (1) A person who is severely
mentally disabled and in need of treatment, as defined in section 301(a), may be
made subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment upon a determination of clear
and present danger under section 7301(b)(1) (serious bodily harm to others), or sec-
tion 7301(b)(2)(i) (inability to care for himself, creating a danger of death or serious
harm to himself), or 7301(b)(2)(ii) (attempted suicide), or 7301(b)(2)(iii) (self-
mutilation).
Id.
46. Id. at § 7304(b) and (c).
47. Id. at § 7304(b)(2). This section of the statute provides:
The petition shall be in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall
include a statement of the facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe that the
person is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment. The petition shall
state the name of any examining physician and the substance of his opinion regarding
the mental condition of the person. It shall also state that the person has been given
the information required by subsection (b)(3).
Id.
48. Id. at § 7304(b)(1). Section 7304(b)(1) states: "Petition for court-ordered involun-
tary treatment for persons already subject to treatment under section 7305 may be made by
the county administrator or the director of the facility to the court of common pleas." Id.
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opinion of the mental state of the individual. 9 A copy of the peti-
tion, along with an explanation of the proceedings and the individ-
ual's rights, must be served upon the individual, her attorney and
other persons designated by the individual.50 A hearing must be
held within five days of the filing of the petition; however, treat-
ment can continue during the time between the filing of the peti-
tion and the hearing.
5 1
If the individual is not currently undergoing involuntary treat-
ment, any responsible person may file with the court of common
pleas a petition that sets forth reasonable grounds to indicate that
the individual presents a clear and present danger to herself or
others.5 2 If there was an examination by a physician, the petition
must give the physician's name and her opinion concerning the
mental state of the individual in question. 3 The court must then
determine if the petition contains reasonable cause to believe the
individual is a clear and present danger to herself or others. If the
court makes such a determination, an attorney must be appointed
to represent the individual.
5 4
49. Id. at § 7304(b)(2).
50. Id. at § 7304(b)(3), which states:
(3) Upon the filing of the petition the county administrator shall serve a copy on the
person, his attorney, and those designated to be kept informed, as provided in section
7302(c), including an explanation of the nature of the proceedings, the person's right
to an attorney and the services of an expert in the field of mental health, as provided
by subsection (d).
Id.
51. Id. at §§ 7304(b)(4) and (5). Section 7304(b)(4) reads: "A hearing on the petition
shall be held in all cases, not more than five days after the filing of the petition." Id. Section
7304(b)(5) states: "Treatment shall be permitted to be maintained pending the determina-
tion of the petition." Id.
52. Id. at § 7304(c)(1). This section states: "Any responsible party may file a petition
in the court of common pleas requesting court-ordered involuntary treatment for any person
not already in involuntary treatment for whom application could be made under subsection
(a)." Id.
53. Id. at § 7304(c)(2). Section 7304(c)(2) provides:
The petition shall be in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall set
forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe that the person is within the
criteria for court-ordered treatment set forth in subsection (a). The petition shall
state the name of any examining physician and the substance of his opinion regarding
the mental condition of the person.
Id.
54. Id. at § 7304(c)(3). This section provides:
Upon a determination that the petition sets forth such reasonable cause, the court
shall appoint an attorney to represent the person and set a date for the hearing as
soon as practicable. The attorney shall represent the person unles§ it shall appear
that he can afford, and desires to have, private representation.
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A hearing must be held within a reasonable period of time55 and
a copy of the petition must be served upon the individual at least
three days prior to the hearing.50 The individual must also be in-
formed that an attorney has been appointed for her and that she
has the right to the assistance of a mental health professional.5 7 A
psychiatric examination, at which counsel may be present, will be
ordered upon motion by either party or the court itself.58 The re-
port of this examination must be provided to the court and counsel
within forty-eight hours of the date of the hearing.5 Treatment
cannot be authorized prior to the hearing. 0
Various due process protections are built into the hearing pro-
cess under this section of the statute."1 These protections include,
inter alia, the right to counsel and the assistance of a mental
health professional, to be court appointed, if necessary; the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses; the right to a public hear-
ing; and the right to refuse to testify against one's self 2 These
55. Id.
56. Id. at § 7304(c)(4). This section reads:
The court, by summons, shall direct the person to appear for a hearing. The court
may issue a warrant directing a person authorized by the county administrator or a
peace officer to bring such person before the court at the time of the hearing if there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the person will not appear voluntarily. A copy
of the petition shall be served on such person at least three days before the hearing
together with a notice advising him that an attorney has been appointed who shall
represent him unless he obtains an attorney himself, that he has a right to be assisted
in the proceedings by an expert in the field of mental health, and that he may request
or be made subject to psychiatric examination under subsection (c)(5).
Id.
57. Id. This assistance will be provided without expense. Id. at § 7304(d).
58. Id. at § 7304(c)(5). Section 7304(c)(5) provides:
Upon motion of either the petitioner or the person, or upon its own motion, the court
may order the person to be examined by a psychiatrist appointed by the court. Such
examination shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, and the person shall have the
right to have counsel present. A report of the examination shall be given to the court
and counsel at least 48 hours prior to the hearing.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at § 7304(c)(6), which states: "Involuntary treatment shall not be authorized
during the pendency of a petition except in accordance with section 7302 or section 7303."
Id.
61. Id. at § 7304(e).
62. Id. at § 7304(e). Section 7304(e) reads as follows:
(e) HEARINGS OF PETITION FOR COURT-ORDER INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT. - A hearing
on a petition for court-ordered involuntary treatment shall be conducted according to
the following:
(1) The person shall have the right to counsel and to the assistance of an expert in
mental health.
(2) The person shall not be called as a witness without his consent.
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provisions apply to both those who are undergoing involuntary
treatment when proceedings are instituted and those who are not.8 3
A decision must be issued within forty-eight hours of the close of
the record."' If the decision orders treatment, it must be the least
restrictive type of treatment," and may not exceed ninety days.66
(3) The person shall have the right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses and to
present evidence in his own behalf.
(4) The hearing shall be public unless it is requested to be private by the person or
his counsel.
(5) A stenographic or other sufficient record shall be made, which shall be impounded
by the court and may be obtained or examined only upon the request of the person or
his counsel or by order of the court on good cause shown.
(6) The hearing shall be conducted by a judge or by a mental health review officer
and may be held at a location other than a courthouse when doing so appears to be in
the best interest of the person.
(7) A decision shall be rendered within 48 hours after the close of evidence.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at § 7304(e)(7).
65. Id. at § 7304(f). This section provides:
Upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person is severely mentally
disabled and in need of treatment and subject to subsection (a), an order shall be
entered directing treatment of the person in an approved facility as an inpatient or
an outpatient, or a combination of such treatment as the director of the facility shall
from time to time determine. Inpatient treatment shall be deemed appropriate only
after full consideration has been given to less restrictive alternatives. Investigation of
treatment alternatives shall include consideration of the person's relationship to his
community and family, his employment possibilities, all available community re-
sources, and guardianship services. An order for inpatient treatment shall include
findings on this issue.
Id.
66. Id. at § 7304(g). Section 7304(g) states:
(g) DURATION OF COURT-ORDERED INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT. - (1) A person may be
made subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment under this section for a period
not to exceed 90 days, excepting only that: Persons may be made subject to court-
ordered involuntary treatment under this section for a period not to exceed one year
if the person meets the criteria established by clause (2).
(2) A person may be subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment for a period not
to exceed one year if:
(i) severe mental disability is based on acts giving rise to the following charges under
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code: murder (sec. 2502); voluntary manslaughter (sec.
2503); aggravated assaulted (sec. 2702); kidnapping (sec. 2901); rape (sec. 3121(1) and
(2)); involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (sec. 3123(1) and (2)); arson (sec. 3301);
and
(ii) a finding of incompetency to be tried or a verdict of acquittal because of lack of
criminal responsibility has been entered.
(3) If at any time the director of a facility concludes that the person is not severely
mentally disabled or in need of treatment pursuant to subsection (a), he shall dis-
charge the person provided that no person subjected to involuntary treatment pursu-
ant to clause (2) may be discharged without a hearing conducted pursuant to clause
(4).
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If the decision is issued by a mental health review officer, rather
than a judge, the decision must be reviewed by the court of com-
mon pleas. 7
After the expiration of the ninety day period, additional involun-
tary treatment may be ordered if it is deemed necessary."8 The
(4) In cases involving involuntary treatment pursuant to clause (2), whenever the pe-
riod of court-ordered involuntary treatment is about to expire and neither the direc-
tor nor the county administrator intends to apply for an additional period of court-
ordered involuntary treatment pursuant to section 7305, or at any time the director
concludes that the person is not severely mentally disabled or in need of treatment,
the director shall petition the court which ordered the involuntary treatment for the
unconditional or conditional release of the person. Notice of such petition shall be
given to the person, the county administrator and the district attorney. Within 15
days after the petition has been filed, the court shall hold a hearing to determine if
the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment. Petitions which
must be filed simply because the period of involuntary treatment will expire shall be
filed at least ten days prior to the expiration of the court-ordered period of involun-
tary treatment. If the court determines after hearing that the person is severely men-
tally disabled and in need of treatment, it may order additional involuntary treat-
ment not to exceed one year; if the court does not so determine, it shall order the
discharge of the person.
Id.
67. This is not expressly stated in § 7304, but it is found in § 7109(b), as follows:
In all cases in which the hearing is conducted by a mental health review officer, a
person made subject to treatment shall have the right to petition the court of com-
mon pleas for review of the certification. A hearing shall be held within 72 hours after
the petition is filed unless a continuance is requested by the person's counsel. The
hearing shall include a review of the certification and such evidence as the court may
receive or require. If the court determines that further involuntary treatment is nec-
essary and that the procedures prescribed by this act have been followed, it shall
deny the petition. Otherwise, the person shall be discharged.
Id. at § 7109(b).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in In re Chambers, 282 Pa. Super. 327, 422 A.2d 1140
(1980), held that as section 7304 provided that an individual be committed upon order of a
court, and as a mental health review officer could issue only a certification and not an order,
the court of common pleas had to issue a commitment order in § 7304 cases. Id. at 331-32,
422 A.2d at 1141-42.
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 7305 (Purdon Supp. 1988). This section reads as follows:
(a) At the expiration of a period of court-ordered involuntary treatment under section
7304(g) or this section, the court may order treatment for an additional period upon
the application of the county administrator or the direction of the facility in which
the person is receiving treatment. Such order shall be entered upon a hearing on
findings as required by sections 7301(a) and (b), and the further finding of the need
for continuing involuntary treatment as shown by conduct during the person's most
recent period of court-ordered treatment. The additional period of involuntary treat-
ment shall not exceed 180 days; provided that persons meeting the criteria of section
7304(g)(2) may be subject to an additional period of up to one year of involuntary
treatment. A person found dangerous to himself under section 7301(b)(2)(i), (ii) or
(iii) shall be subject to an additional period of involuntary full-time inpatient treat-
ment only if he has first been released to a less restrictive alternative. This limitation
shall not apply where, upon application made by the county administrator or facility
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statute contains procedures similar to those previously described
for ordering this additional treatment. 9
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD
Since the enactment of the Mental Health Procedures Act, the
Pennsylvania appellate courts have reviewed a number of lower
court decisions concerning involuntary civil commitments.7" There-
fore, the courts have had an opportunity to determine the proper
application of the clear and present danger standard in involuntary
commitment proceedings. However, in doing so the courts have
stayed strictly within the confines of the statutory language and
have not attempted to carve out unique judicial interpretations.
In various cases, courts have indicated what type of behavior
meets the clear and present danger standard. In Commonwealth
ex. rel. Platt v. Platt,7 1 appellant's husband had her involuntarily
committed under section 7302.72 After the commitment period ex-
pired, further commitment was sought under section 7303.73 At the
informal hearing required under section 7303, appellant's husband
testified that she threw a jar in the bathroom, breaking it, and that
she screamed at him. 7 Appellant's son testified that she had
thrown a chair at one of the children, which although missing the
child, shattered against a wall. 75 Also, the son stated that she had
burned some of his brother's possessions and struck or attempted
to strike the children on various occasions.7 1 Owing to various ob-
jections, the testimony of a psychiatrist was not presented.
77
director, it is determined by a judge or mental health review officer that such release
would not be in the person's best interest.
(b) The director of the facility in which the person is receiving treatment shall notify
the county administrator at least ten days prior to the expiration of a period of invol-
untary commitment ordered under section 7304 or this section.
Id.
69. Id.
70. This comment covers only a representative sampling of these cases.
71. 266 Pa. Super. 276, 404 A.2d 410 (1979).
72. Id. at 281, 404 A.2d at 412.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 291, 404 A.2d at 417.
75. Id. at 291, 404 A.2d at 417-18.
76. Id. at 291, 404 A.2d at 418.
77. Id. at 292, 404 A.2d at 418. The appellant's psychiatrist appeared at the informal
hearing, but did not testify as appellant's counsel threatened him with legal sanctions if he
testified. These threatened legal sanctions were based on appellant's counsel's contentions
that this testimony would violate the patient-physician privilege. Id. at 285, 404 A.2d at 414-
15. Therefore, the only medical evidence presented was a physician's certificate appended to
the original petition for commitment. Id. at 291, 404 A.2d at 418.
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Following this hearing, the mental health review officer ordered
a twenty day commitment and Mrs. Platt appealed.78 The court of
common pleas affirmed the decision and Mrs. Platt sought a review
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. a In reviewing the record, the
superior court found that the lay testimony presented established
that Mrs. Platt was a clear and present danger to others, but that
as lay testimony alone could not support a commitment, a remand
was required to obtain the medical testimony required by the
statute.80
In re Condrys' is another superior court case in which the court
agreed that appellant met the clear and present danger standard,
but vacated the commitment order on other grounds.8 2 Condry had
originally voluntarily admitted himself to a state hospital for treat-
ment of his mental illness; however, he then wished to be dis-
charged.8 3 At that point, the staff of the hospital filed a petition for
involuntary treatment under section 7302.4 A subsequent section
7303 petition was also filed by the hospital staff.8 5
At a hearing held on this petition, a psychiatrist from the hospi-
tal testified concerning appellant's mental state. 88 The mental
health review officer issued an order committing Condry to the
hospital for up to twenty days of treatment.8 7 Pursuant to the stat-
ute, Condry requested a review of this order by the court of com-
mon pleas.88 The court refused to review the order, thereby up-
holding the commitment order.8
78. Id. at 281, 404 A.2d at 413.
79. Id. Appellant also filed applications for a stay pending appeal with the court of
common pleas and the superior court, both of which were denied. Id.
80. Id. at 291-92, 404 A.2d at 418. The court also dealt with appellant's arguments
that her husband and her psychiatrist should have been barred from testifying because of
privilege. The court held that a spouse is competent to testify in commitment proceeding as
it is not an adversary proceeding to which interspousal privilege would apply, and that a
spouse's observations of the other's behavior do not constitute communications protected by
the privilege. Id. at 282-84, 404 A.2d at 413-14. The court also held that the physician-
patient privilege does not apply in mental health proceedings. Id. at 284-90, 404 A.2d at
414-17.
81. 304 Pa. Super. 131, 450 A.2d 136 (1982).
82. Id. at 136-37, 450 A.2d at 138-39. The court vacated the commitment order as the
certification order did not include, as required by the statute, a description of the treatment
to be provided. Id. at 137, 450 A.2d at 139.




87. Id. at 134, 450 A.2d at 137-38.
88. Id. at 134, 450 A.2d at 138.
89. Id. at 134, 450 A.2d at 137.
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court then heard Condry's appeal in
which he alleged, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to
justify commitment.90 In rejecting Condry's contention, the court
apparently relied upon the testimony of the psychiatrist with re-
spect to Condry's mental condition. 1 In its opinion, the court sum-
marized his testimony, noting that the doctor diagnosed appel-
lant's condition as paranoid schizophrenia.9 2 The court further
noted that the doctor testified that Condry believed that the staff
of the hospital were KGB agents or communists and that he acted
accordingly, for example, by refusing to eat because he believed
that the food was poisoned. 3 Also, the psychiatrist stated that the
appellant did not care for his personal hygiene needs.94 This testi-
mony persuaded the court that Condry was a clear and present
danger to himself.9 5 However, because the certification did not in-
clude a description of the treatment to be provided as required by
section 7303(d)(2), the commitment order was vacated.9
Several years later, the superior court in In re S.O., 97 again
found that appellants met the clear and present danger standard,
but found the commitment procedure deficient.98 However, rather
than vacate the order, the court affirmed the commitment and or-
dered that all future cases comport with the procedure set forth in
its opinion.99
90. Id. at 136, 450 A.2d at 138-39.
91. Id. at 136, 450 A.2d at 139.
92. Id. at 134, 450 A.2d at 137.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 136, 450 A.2d at 139.
96. Id. at 137, 450 A.2d at 139. See supra notes 41 for the complete text of
§ 7303(d)(2).
97. 342 Pa. Super. 215, 492 A.2d 727 (1985).
98. Id. at 232-35, 492 A.2d at 736-37. In discussing the importance of due process in
commitment proceedings, the court stated:
[I]t must be remembered that the mental condition of the person in no way dimin-
ishes his right to due process. We must reiterate the principle that the Act was in-
tended 'to create a treatment scheme under which a patient's procedural protections
expand progressively as deprivation of his liberty gradually increases.' In re C.B.,
supra at 181, 452 A.2d at 1374. Without ascribing to the court or to appellee ill will or
in fact any negative intent, it would appear that the rights of the appellants herein
have been treated as a de minimis matter. As this Court held in Blaker, supra, 'It is
not enough to find,. . that appellant 'was truly in need of the services offered by
[the] mental health system." Id. at 398, 446 A.2d at 980. Where procedural require-
ments are not fulfilled the commitment is unlawful.
Id. at 233-34, 492 A.2d at 737.
99. Id. at 234-35, 492 A.2d at 737. The court determined that appellants' rights must
be balanced against their need for treatment in determining what relief to grant and stated:
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This case involved two individuals, R.T. and S.O., both of whom
were challenging recommitment orders issued under section
7305.100 The court held that in recommitment proceedings it must
be established that the behavior justifying the initial commitment
had occurred, although that behavior need not have recurred prior
to the recommitment proceedings.0 ' The court then reviewed the
evidence concerning the original commitments and determined
that both R.T. and S.O. met the standard.10 R.T. met the stan-
dard because he was diagnosed as a schizophrenic, and throughout
the original commitment and recommitment proceedings he was
experiencing violent auditory and visual hallucinations.103 He had
threatened to kill his mother and police officers while on leave
from the hospital.1 0 4 It was also determined that S.O., a chronic
schizophrenic, presented a clear and present danger to herself be-
cause she lived in an abandoned house without heat or other utili-
ties.105 This lack of heat resulted in S.O. losing several toes to
frostbite.106 There was also evidence that S.O. had exhibited ab-
normal behavior by running in and out of traffic and walking down
the middle of a street filled with traffic. 107
The court noted that this behavior was more than merely uncon-
ventional, as alleged by appellants, as it threatened the safety of
Especially in dealing with the mentally ill, custom and practice have in the past al-
lowed society to look benignly at treatment which can only be described as barbarous.
It is no less true now that habit necessarily provides no reliable indicium of anything
more than the expedient unless it conforms precisely to the requirements of legisla-
tion designed to safeguard both the rights and the lives of those so affected. We can-
not, in exercising our paternalistic impulses, forget that due process requirements
must be met to assure compliance with legal standards related to the restriction of
liberty. We do not mean to denigrate good intentions, but only to make clear that
more is required than a sincere desire to help. Assistance must be rendered properly,
or in a larger sense, this carefully balanced system will fail.
On the other hand, the same restraint of liberty which prevents us from shouting
'fire' in a crowded theater, prohibits as well the exercise of 'liberty' by those to whom
it is in fact anathema, spelling certain, although possibly slow, destruction. It is this
consideration which must affect most strongly our determination of appropriate
relief.
Id. at 234-35, 492 A.2d at 737.
100. Id. at 219-20, 492 A.2d at 729.
101. Id. at 232, 492 A.2d at 736.
102. Id. at 232-33, 492 A.2d at 736.
103. Id. at 232, 492 A.2d at 736.
104. Id.




appellants and others, thereby satisfying the statutory standard.10 8
In affirming the commitment orders, the court recognized that the
appellants' need for treatment outweighed the procedural irregu-
larities, but also insured that these procedural deficiencies would
not be tolerated in the future. 10 9 Thus, the court recognized that
the policy embodied in the involuntary commitment statute may
not always be best served by strict adherence to procedure.110 This
case contrasts with Condry, and perhaps reflects an evolution
through experience in the courts' consideration of such cases.
In Commonwealth v. Rommett,"' the superior court refined the
standard as it applies to recommitment proceedings." 2 Rommett
was originally involuntarily committed in February, 1986, because
of violent behavior she exhibited toward her family."' She was re-
committed three times before the proceeding at issue." 4 At the last
recommitment hearing, Rommett's psychiatrist testified that she
exhibited assaultive behavior toward him, and that she was suffer-
ing from delusions, poor impulse control and paranoia resulting
from schizophrenia." 5 The doctor opined that Rommett's violent
behavior would recur if treatment ceased." 6 On the basis of this
testimony, Rommett was recommitted for additional treatment." 7
She appealed from that order." 8
In her appeal, Rommett argued that the evidence presented was
not sufficient to meet the clear and present danger standard be-
cause it did not prove that she had attempted to inflict or had
inflicted serious bodily injury on someone within thirty days prior
to the hearing."9 The court rejected this argument, pointing out
that the statute provides that in recommitment proceedings it is
not necessary to show that an overt act had occurred within thirty
days of the recommitment hearing.2 0 The court recognized that
the proper question in such proceedings was whether Rommett's
condition indicated that there was a clear and present danger to
108. Id. at 231-33, 492 A.2d at 736.
109. Id. at 234-35, 492 A.2d at 737.
110. Id.
111. 372 Pa. Super. 41, 538 A.2d 1339 (1987).
112. Id. at 44-46, 538 A.2d at 1341.
113. Id. at 43, 538 A.2d at 1340.
114. Id. at 43, 538 A.2d at 1340-41.
115. Id. at 44, 538 A.2d at 1341.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 43, 538 A.2d at 1340.
119. Id. at 44-45, 538 A.2d at 1341-42.
120. Id. at 45-46, 538 A.2d at 1342.
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others, and not whether overt manifestations of this behavior had
occurred.12 ' Further, the court held that although under the stat-
ute the circumstances leading to the original commitment had to
be shown to have occurred, the facts leading to the first commit-
ment did not have to be relitigated as long as the individual's his-
tory documented this behavior, unless the original commitment
was being challenged during recommitment proceedings.'22
The court then found that Rommett met the clear and present
danger standard upon original commitment and that she continued
to manifest violent behavior during her hospitalization, thereby
supporting a recommitment.'2' Also, the court noted that the doc-
tor's diagnosis and prognosis of her condition supported
recommitment.'24
In contrast to the cases where it was found that the individual
presented a clear and present danger to herself or others are the
cases which determine that the individual does not meet the stan-
dard. An examination of several of these cases, as compared to the
previous cases, illustrates the serious type of mental illness that
must be present for an individual to meet the standard. Also, these
cases illustrate the difficulty the courts have in determining which
individuals pose a clear and present danger.
In Commonwealth ex. rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto,26 the appellant
had been involuntarily committed to Easton Hospital under sec-
tion 7302.126 He subsequently escaped from the hospital, but was
apprehended and admitted to Allentown State Hospital, from
which he was later discharged. 2 7 Several weeks after his discharge,
he was arrested on various charges, and after pleading guilty to
some of the charges, was examined by a psychiatrist, who recom-
mended further treatment.1 28 A petition for involuntary commit-
121. Id. at 45, 538 A.2d at 1341.
122. Id. at 46, 538 A.2d at 1342.
123. Id. at 46-47, 538 A.2d at 1342.
124. Id. In making this conclusion the court stated: "In addition, her diagnosis as a
paranoid schizophrenic with delusions that others are threatening her, together with the
prognosis that her assaultive behavior would continue without further treatment, support
the trial court's findings." Id.
125. 497 Pa. 66, 439 A.2d 105 (1981).
126. Id. at 67, 439 A.2d at 105. Appellant's original commitment stemmed from his
behavior in a youth home. Id.
127. Id. at 68, 439 A.2d at 105.
128. Id. at 68, 439 A.2d at 105-06. Appellant was charged with burglary, criminal mis-
chief and criminal attempt to commit arson. The latter charge was dismissed and Gibson
pled guilty to the remaining charges. The psychiatric examination was in connection with
the pre-sentence report. Id. at 68, 439 A.2d at 106.
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ment was filed, and at a hearing before a mental health review of-
ficer, Gibson was ordered to be committed to Farview State
Hospital for up to ninety days.'29 This finding was reviewed and
affirmed by the court of common pleas. 130
Gibson appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the lower
court's determination in an opinion by Judge Hester.1"' The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court granted review and overturned the com-
mitment order. 32 The supreme court held that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that Gibson was a clear and present danger to
himself or others. 33 In making its determination regarding clear
and present danger, the superior court had relied on testimony to
the effect that while incarcerated Gibson had been found with a
burning paper in his cell, had fashioned a crude weapon from a
coat hanger and had refused psychotropic medication."" The su-
preme court held that this behavior did not rise to the level neces-
sary to satisfy the clear and present danger standard. 35 The court
came to this conclusion despite the fact that a psychiatrist testified
that Gibson was a schizophrenic suffering from paranoid delusions,
and that he posed a clear and present danger to himself and
others. 3 "
The decision in Gibson is important in several respects. First of
all, it illustrates that an individual may suffer from a serious
mental illness, such as schizophrenia, and still not meet the stan-
dard for involuntary commitment. As the supreme court recog-
nized, the statute requires either an overt act that illustrates a
clear and present danger to self or others, or behavior that illus-
trates an inability to care for one's self to such an extent that it
threatens health or life.1 7 Mere manifestations of a mental illness
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 261 Pa. Super. 53, 395 A.2d 938 (1978).
132. Gibson, 497 Pa. at 66, 439 A.2d at 105.
133. Id. at 70-71, 439 A.2d at 107.
134. Id. at 70-71, 439 A.2d at 106.
135. Id. at 70-71, 439 A.2d at 107. The court in so finding, stated:
Clearly none of the above instances constituted the overt act required by The Mental
Health Procedures Act nor do they show such inability on the part of appellant to
attend to his needs as to threaten death, serious bodily injury, or serious physical
debilitation. As there was insufficient evidence that appellant posed a clear and pre-
sent danger to himself or others under the Act, the hearing court erred in ordering
appellant's involuntary commitment.
Id.
136. Id. at 68, 439 A.2d at 106.
137. Id. at 70, 439 A.2d at 107.
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are not enough to meet the standard even if they are accompanied
by a psychiatrist's opinion. 8
This last point is significant as it contrasts with the superior
court's opinion in this case, which relied heavily upon the physi-
cian's testimony. It also contrasts with the superior court's opinion
in Platt, where the court determined that similar behavior by Platt
met the statutory standard. 3 9 It is interesting to speculate, given
the supreme court's opinion in Gibson, how it would have viewed
Platt's behavior, which the superior court found established a clear
and present danger to others. 14 0 It would seem that the supreme
court would have viewed her behavior as manifestations of mental
illness not severe enough to warrant commitment, or perhaps as
mere normal outbursts of anger as the dissent in Platt viewed it.'
4 '
This is especially likely given the court's disagreement with the su-
perior court concerning the seriousness of Gibson's behavior. 142
Gibson and Platt are illustrative of cases where it is difficult to
determine whether the individual meets the clear and present dan-
ger standard. In other cases, however, such as Condry and Rom-
mett, it is quite clear that the person does meet the standard. Yet,
in others such as Commonwealth v. Blaker"'4 and In re Remly,14 it
is clear that the person does not meet the standard.
In Blaker, involuntary commitment was sought after Blaker, a
woman in her mid-sixties, became upset during a lunch at a senior
citizens center and left the center. 4 5 When a worker who found
Blaker fifty yards away attempted to lead her to a bus to go home,
Blaker struck the worker with her umbrella. Later, Blaker peace-
fully entered the bus and was driven home.
14
Shortly after the incident, Blaker was involuntarily committed
under section 7302, and later a section 7303 petition was filed.
47
Following the informal hearing, the mental health review officer
found that Blaker posed a clear and present danger to others and
138. Id. at 71, 439 A.2d at 107.
139. Platt, 266 Pa. Super. at 291, 404 A.2d at 417-18.
140. Id. at 291, 404 A.2d at 418.
141. Id. at 296-97, 404 A.2d at 420-21. Judge Spaeth wrote an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part. He concurred with the majority's decision to remand the case,
and to allow Platt's husband to testify at the new hearing, but disagreeing with the court's
decision allowing the psychiatrist to testify. Id. at 292, 404 A.2d at 418.
142. Gibson, 497 Pa. at 70-71, 439 A.2d at 107.
143. 293 Pa. Super. 391, 446 A.2d 976 (1981).
144. 324 Pa. Super. 163, 471 A.2d 514 (1984).
145. Blaker, 293 Pa. Super. at 394, 446 A.2d at 978.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 394, 446 A.2d at 977.
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should be committed for another ten days. 1 8 The court of common
pleas reviewed the order and found that Blaker was a danger to
herself, not others, but allowed the commitment order to stand.14 9
Blaker appealed, and the superior court found the evidence insuffi-
cient to support commitment. 150 The court pointed out that other
than the umbrella incident, there were no other reported episodes
of violence.151 Furthermore, although a psychologist had examined
Blaker when she was originally committed, he did not state that
her behavior, wandering away from the senior citizens center,
could result in death, serious bodily injury or debilitation. 152 Al-
though the court agreed that Blaker might need some testing or
services, she did not meet the clear and present danger standard. 153
In re Remly 54 concerned the involuntary commitment of an ad-
mittedly senile eighty-two year old man.155 Remly supposedly
posed a clear and present danger to himself and others because he
needed his wife's assistance in caring for his needs, and he once
kicked his wife and swatted at her with a paring knife.156 The
court, in overturning the involuntary commitment order, noted
that senility alone was not sufficient to justify commitment.' 57 In-
stead, the court determined that a mental illness resulting in be-
havior that demonstrates a clear and present danger must be
shown.158 In reviewing the record, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence of such a mental illness resulting in the type
of behavior necessary to order commitment. 59
The court sympathized with this attempt to help Remly, and
recognized that perhaps he needed skilled nursing care. However,
the court stated that using the involuntary commitment statute
was not the proper means by which to procure the needed
148. Id. at 395, 446 A.2d at 978.
149. Id. In reviewing the decision, the lower court listened to a tape recording of the
hearing before a MHRO and heard argument from appellant's counsel. Id.
150. Id. at 393, 446 A.2d at 978.
151. Id. at 397, 446 A.2d at 979.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 398, 446 A.2d at 980. Judge O'Kicki filed a dissenting opinion in which he
opined that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Blaker met the clear and
present danger standard. Id. at 403-04, 446 A.2d at 982.
154. 324 Pa. Super. 163, 471 A.2d 514 (1984).
155. Id. at 166, 471 A.2d at 515.
156. Id. at 167-68, 471 A.2d at 516.
157. Id. at 166, 471 A.2d at 515.
158. Id. at 166-67, 471 A.2d at 515-16.




CRITICISM OF THE STANDARD
The aforementioned cases illustrate some of the problems that
the statute's critics allege are posed by the clear and present dan-
ger standard. The Gibson case illustrates what some people view as
the standard's laxness, in that it does not allow for the commit-
ment of potentially dangerous and/or violent mentally ill individu-
als. Critics are concerned that the stringent requirements regard-
ing evidence that the person poses a clear and present danger will
not protect the public from dangerous individuals.' To support
their position, critics point to notorious cases, such as the Sylvia
Seegrest incident 62 or the incident in Pittsburgh in which a young
hospital social worker was killed by a schizophrenic woman who
had been in and out of mental hospitals for eighteen years,6 3 to
demonstrate that the Pennsylvania standard allows dangerous per-
sons to escape commitment, or to be committed for only a short
period of time. Accordingly, such critics advocate a standard that
permits commitment under a lessened standard, for longer periods
of time.
Others criticize the standard on the basis that it is detrimental
to the mentally ill. Attorneys, mental health professionals, the
mentally ill and their families have pointed out that since Pennsyl-
vania and other states have changed commitment standards and
procedures, there has been a drastic decrease in the number of
mentally ill persons who are institutionalized.1 64 As a result, many
160. Id. at 169-71, 471 A.2d at 517. In so finding, the court stated:
There are indications in the record before us that appellant and his wife were caught
in the grasp of well-intentioned officials. But, when the awesome power of the govern-
ment bureaucracy and the courts is brought to bear on the individual citizen, good
intentions are not enough. Even though they may be motivated by a desire to help
the individual, the actions of the government must be strictly circumscribed by the
law. This is most particularly mandatory when the governmental action involves the
deprivation of the citizen's liberty. The courts, in overseeing such liberty-depriving
bureaucratic action, must be especially protective of the rights of the individual and
vigilant in ensuring that the legal safeguards have been complied with.
Id. at 170, 471 A.2d 517.
161. For information concerning the difficulty in predicting dangerousness, see Dia-
mond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974).
162. In the Matter of Sylvia Seegrist, - Pa. Super. -, 539 A.2d 799 (1988).
163. Hostage Taker Kills Hospital Employee, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 17, 1988,
at 1, col. 2.
164. For a detailed history of the deinstitutionalization trend, see Myers, Involuntary
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of Changes, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367,
388-403 (1984) [hereinafter Myers], and Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Reinstitutionaliza-
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of those who are no longer institutionalized now represent the
many mentally ill homeless people.1 65 Some critics state that the
mentally ill are "rotting with their rights on 1 66 or have gone from
"back wards to back alleys.
1 67
This criticism of the deinstitutionalization program and how this
trend was brought about or effected by the change in commitment
standards must be thoughtfully addressed. The massive deinstitu-
tionalization of the mentally ill began in the late 1940's and oc-
curred for many reasons, including concern for the rights of the
mentally ill.' 68 However, this movement was also brought about be-
cause of changing medical theories' 69 exposes of the conditions in
institutions,'7 0 the advent of psychotropic drugs,' 7 ' new social leg-
islation,172 and economic concerns. 7  This movement was accom-
panied by a trend toward civil commitment procedures that em-
phasized more stringent standards for commitment.
74
This trend wrought tremendous changes in the care and treat-
ment of the mentally ill in the United States, including Pennsylva-
tion, Homelessness and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375 (1983) [hereinafter Rhoden].
165. Rhoden, supra note 164, at 375-76.
166. Appelbaum & Gutheil, Rotting with their Rights On: Constitutional Theory and
Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 306 (1979).
167. New York State Assembly Subcomm. of Community Aftercare, From Back
Wards to Back Alleys (1978).
168. Myers, supra note 164, at 394-400, and Rhoden, supra note 164, at 385-86.
169. Myers, supra note 164, at 389-90.
170. Rhoden, supra note 164, at 380-81.
171. Id. at 378-79.
172. Myers, supra note 164, at 391, and Rhoden, supra note 164, at 383-84. Both My-
ers and Rhoden point out that legislation such as the Mental Retardation Facilities and
Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2689(b)(1) (Supp. II
1978), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 560 (1981), and social programs
such as Medicaid and Medicare have encouraged deinstitutionalization. Id.
173. Rhoden, supra note 164, at 381-82. Rhoden indicates that although concern about
the cost of care for the mentally ill was not the primary reason for deinstitutionalization,
these concerns did contribute to the trend. Id.
174. Myers, supra note 164, at 394-400. Myers cites Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966), a case in which the importance of community care was stressed, and Wyatt
v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), one of the first cases in which a court
stepped in to correct horrendous conditions in a state mental hospital. Rhoden also cites
Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975), which established that patients have a
right to care in the least restrictive setting and that the government must establish and
utilize community care programs, and Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), prior judgment reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D.
Wis. 1976), which held that certain due process protections were required in civil commit-
ment proceedings, as illustrations of cases that exemplify the trend toward less stringent
commitment standards. Rhoden, supra note 164, at 386-87.
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nia. 75 Although these changes have been largely positive, the nega-
tive aspects of these changes must be recognized so that solutions
can be found to these problems.
SOLUTIONS
There are various solutions to consider. The first of these is a
change in the standard for civil commitment. Alan F. Stone, M.D.,
is a leading advocate of changing the commitment standard. He
and Clifford D. Stromberg have drafted a model law for civil com-
mitment.17 6 This standard has various differences from the Penn-
sylvania standard.
The model law provides for emergency psychiatric examination
upon certification by a physician if the individual suffers from a
severe mental disorder that makes it likely that she will cause
harm to herself, or others, is manifestly unable to care for basic
needs, and immediate hospitalization is required to prevent harm
to herself or others.'77 This examination may also be initiated by a
police officer taking the individual into custody,'7 8 or by petition
175. There are now only 13,000 persons undergoing treatment in state mental hospi-
tals in Pennsylvania, compared to 225,000 receiving outpatient mental health services. See
Moushey, A Question of Care, Follow-Up: The Neglected Side of Treatment, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, June 28, 1988, at 1, 5, col. 2-3.
176. Stromberg & Stone, A Model Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20
HAR V. J. ON LEGis. 275 (1983) [hereinafter Model Law].
177. Model Law, supra note 176, at 319. The Model Law states:
A person may be taken into custody by a police officer, or accepted by an ambulance
service, and transported and presented to a treatment facility for emergency psychi-
atric evaluation, when a licensed physician certifies in writing that he has examined
the patient in the last 72 hours or has ongoing medical responsibility for the person
and has knowledge of his current condition, and that on such basis he has probable
cause to believe that such person is suffering from a severe mental disorder as a result
of which: he lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment; and
he is (1) likely to cause harm to himself or to suffer substantial mental or physical
deterioration, or (2) likely to cause harm to others; and immediate hospitalization is
necessary to prevent such harm.
Id.
178. Model Law, supra note 176, at 315-16, states:
4.A. Detention by a Police Officer.
1. A police officer may take a person into custody, and transport the person to a
treatment facility for emergency psychiatric evaluation if and only if:
a. the person would otherwise be subject to lawful arrest and the police officer be-
lieves that the person is in need of emergency psychiatric treatment; or
b. the police officer has probable cause to believe that the person has attempted sui-
cide within the last 48 hours; or
c. the police officer has probable cause to believe, based on his personal observation
and investigation or based on the petition of any interested adult under subsection
4.C. and such corroboration as the police officer deems necessary in the circum-
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by an interested adult.17 Emergency evaluation and treatment
may not exceed fourteen days,180 and a hearing must be held
within five days of detention.181
The Model Law also provides for additional periods of involun-
tary treatment. 18 A thirty day commitment will be authorized if:
1) the individual is suffering from a severe mental disorder that is
treatable; 2) the individual will not consent to treatment, or is una-
ble to consent and lacks capacity to make decisions concerning
treatment; and 3) the individual is likely to harm himself or others,
stances, that the person is suffering from a severe mental disorder as a result of which
he is likely to cause harm to himself or to others or is manifestly unable to care for
some of his basic needs, and that immediate hospitalization is necessary to prevent
harm to the person or to others; or
d. he is acting upon the certification of a licensed physician under subsection 4.B.
2. Any person taken into custody pursuant to this subsection shall be presented
promptly to a treatment facility. Correctional facilities shall not be used as temporary
shelter for such persons except for the protective custody of the person pending
transportation to a treatment facility.
3. Upon or shortly after taking a person into custody, the police officer shall take
reasonable precautions to safeguard and preserve the personal property of the person
unless a guardian or responsible relative is able to do so. Upon presenting a person to
a treatment facility, the police officer shall inform the staff in writing of the facts that
caused him to take the person into custody, and shall specifically state whether the
person is otherwise subject to arrest.
Id.
179. Model Law, supra note 176, at 320. Section 4.C. of the Model Law reads:
Any interested adult may petition for, or present a person for, emergency psychiatric
evaluation by alleging based on personal observation that he has probable cause to
believe that such person is suffering from a severe mental disorder as the result of
which: he is likely to cause harm to himself or to others or is manifestly unable to
care for some of his basic needs; and immediate hospitalization is necessary to pre-
vent harm to the person or to others.
Id.
180. Model Law, supra note 176, at 324-25. This section provides: "The period of
emergency evaluation and treatment shall in no case exceed fourteen days." Id.
181. Model Law, supra note 176, at 322-32. This section states:
1. Each person who is admitted to a treatment facility shall receive a preliminary
hearing before the court within five business days of admission or be discharged, un-
less he has, after consultation with counsel, executed a written waiver of such hearing.
The hearing shall be informal and subject to such rules as the court sets consistent
with fundamental fairness.
2. The court shall determine at the close of the hearing, or within five business days
of the patient's admission, whether he should be discharged. A patient shall then be
discharged, unless the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that he
satisfies the criteria for thirty-day commitment provided in Section 6, and unless
within two business days of the court's decision a petition for such commitment is
filed with the court.
Id.
182. Model Law, supra note 176, at 329-30.
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or to suffer substantial physical or mental deterioration.18 3 Addi-
tional treatment may also be authorized.184
Unlike the Pennsylvania standard, the Model Law does not ex-
plicitly require objective evidence of harm to oneself.18 Also, the
Model Law's broadest provisions allow for commitment if there is
substantial deterioration in the individual's previous ability to
function caused by "severe and abnormal mental, emotional or
physical distress. 111 6 This standard is meant to include former
mental patients whose condition has deteriorated, perhaps leading
to homelessness or other problems.
18 7
The question still remains, however, whether changing the stan-
183. Model Law, supra note 176, at 330-31. Section 6.3 states:
A person may be involuntarily committed for a period of up to thirty days if, after
the hearing provided in subsection 6.D., the court determines on the basis of clear
and convincing evidence that:
1. the person is suffering from a severe mental disorder; and
2. there is a reasonable prospect that his disorder is treatable at or through the facil-
ity to which he is to be committed, and such commitment would be consistent with
the least restrictive alternative principle; and
3. the person either refuses or is unable to consent to voluntary admission for treat-
ment; and
4. the person lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment; and
5. as the result of the severe mental disorder, the person is (a) likely to cause harm to
himself or to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration, or (b) likely to cause
harm to others.
Id.
184. Model Law, supra note 176, at 378-82.
185. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 7301(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1988), set forth fully in note 20,
supra, requires that certain objective criteria be met. The Model Law standard is more
subjective, requiring behavior:
'[L]ikely to cause harm to himself or to suffer substantial mental or physical deterio-
ration' means that, as evidenced by recent behavior, the person (1) is likely in the
near future to inflict substantial physical injury upon himself, or (2) is substantially
unable to provide for some of his basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, health, or
safety, or (3) will if not treated suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal
mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated with significant
impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior causing a substantial deterioration of
his previous ability to function on his own.
Model Law, supra note 176, at 302-03. The Model Law further provides that:
'[L]ikely to cause harm to others' means that as evidenced by recent behavior caus-
ing, attempting, or threatening such harm, a person is likely in the near future to
cause physical injury or physical abuse to another person or substantial damage to
another person's property.
Id.
186. Model Law, supra note 176, at 302-03.
187. Although the provisions regarding harm to others are objective in nature, the pro-
vision regarding harm to self is much more subjective, allowing for commitment of a number
of individuals not necessarily committable under the Pennsylvania law. See Model Law,
supra note 176, at 303-05.
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dard will actually result in the mentally ill receiving better care or
the state improving its mental health care delivery system. It ap-
pears that the problem may not be in the standard, but in the
mental health care delivery network and state funding for these
services. Therefore, another possible solution is to strengthen the
current mental health care system.
The first place to start would be improving outpatient services.
The Mental Health Procedures Act requires follow-up care for
mentally ill persons released from hospitals through a system of
case management.18 8 Individuals are to be followed through a local
community mental health center;18 9 however, in reality patients are
often not provided with proper instructions regarding follow-up, or
the care that is provided is inadequate.19
The reasons for inadequate follow-up care stem from funding
problems. Although deinstitutionalization began several decades
ago, state legislatures are still providing massive funding for state
hospitals and little for outpatient programs, often because of com-
munity and union pressures. 191 This includes Pennsylvania where
only twenty-eight percent of mental health funding goes toward
outpatient treatment for 225,000 people, and seventy-two percent
of the funding goes to maintain 13,000 mentally ill persons in hos-
pitals.1 92 This has resulted in poor post-discharge treatment, which
then often results in reinstitutionalization of the mentally ill who
do not receive proper aftercare.
Improving follow-up care and other outpatient services would
help decrease the need for inpatient care often brought about by
civil commitment. If individuals are adequately treated as outpa-
tients they will be maintained on proper medication and the pres-
188. Moushey, supra note 175, at 5, col. 1-4. The statute contains provisions requiring
individualized treatment plans, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 7107 (Purdon Supp. 1988), and con-
tinuity of care. Id. at § 7116.
189. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 7116 (Purdon Supp. 1988), which provides:
SEC. 7116. CONTINUITY OF CARE.
(a) It shall be the responsibility of the facility administration to refer those voluntary
and involuntary patients discharged from State institutional programs to the appro-
priate county mental health and mental retardation program.
(b) The county mental health and mental retardation program shall, pursuant to Ar-
ticle III of the 'Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966,' receive referrals
from State-operated facilities and shall be responsible for the treatment needs of
county residents discharged from institutions pursuant to Article II and II of this
Act.
Id.





sures and problems they experience will be dealt with before they
result in commitment. Also, as the statute provides, an individual
may be involuntarily committed to outpatient services. 193 There-
fore, if outpatient services are improved, individuals who do meet
the clear and present danger standard may be more readily admit-
ted to these sort of programs with benefit to both the state and the
individual. In addition, improved outpatient services would benefit
individuals such as Gibson, Blaker and Remly who do not meet the
clear and present danger standard, but need mental health
services.
Better services would also alleviate some of the problems from
which the mentally ill suffer, such as homelessness. Besides treat-
ment for mental illness, improved services would include housing
assistance, assistance with obtaining benefits from social programs,
job training, and educational services. However, improved services
will only be instituted if adequate funding is provided, and if there
is effective management of those funds.
CONCLUSION
There seems little sense in changing the standard for involuntary
civil commitment unless changes in the system are accompanied by
changes in societal attitudes and priorities regarding funding of
mental health programs. For example, merely changing the law will
not eliminate the problem of homelessness, as many homeless peo-
ple are not mentally ill and little is being done to aid them. There-
fore, it is crucial to provide not only new standards, but also ade-
quate funding to help those affected by the new standard. At this
point in time, it would appear more appropriate to improve fund-
ing and services under the present law, rather than to institute new
193. The Mental Health Procedures Act provides generally for outpatient treatment
in § 7104 which states, in pertinent part:
Adequate treatment means a course of treatment designed and administered to alle-
viate a person's pain and distress and to maximize the probability of his recovery
from mental illness. It shall be provided to all persons in treatment who are subject
to this act. It may include inpatient treatment, partial hospitalization, or outpatient
treatment. Adequate inpatient treatment shall include such accommodations, diet,
heat, light, sanitary facilities, clothing, recreation, education and medical care as are
necessary to maintain decent, safe and healthful living conditions.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 7104 (Purdon Supp. 1988). Section 7304(f) specifically provides for
involuntary outpatient treatment. See supra note 65 for a full text of § 7304(0.
352 Vol. 27:325
1989 Involuntary Civil Commitment 353
standards and procedures that may ultimately fail because of con-
tinuing problems with funding and delivery of services.
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